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Abstract 
New econometric evidence is provided to identify the determinants of the rapid credit growth in 
Bulgaria and evaluate whether the credit boom has increased bank fragility, based on a panel data 
analysis of 30 Bulgarian banks over the 1999-2006 period.  Employing Fixed effects and GMM 
estimation techniques to explore the link between credit and capital base in a partial adjustment 
framework, the study provides evidence for the growing risks of credit expansion and assesses the 
potential for banking distress in Bulgaria. 
The paper argues that after a period of severe credit crunch during 1997-1999, foreign-owned 
Bulgarian banks have financed a credit boom, especially since 2003 but this indicated growing risk in 
lending and increasing vulnerability to a systemic banking crisis as banks reduced their capital base 
and registered an increase in non-performing loans.  Aggressive lending by less-capitalized banks without 
appropriate loan loss provisioning has also been verified empirically in a number of panel specifications.  
While well-capitalized banks have tended to expand credit in proportion to their capital base, banks with 
weak capital base engaged in excessive risk taking, and expanded credit despite growing ratio of non-
performing loans.  Hence, the credit boom has come at the expense of increased banking fragility in 
Bulgaria, raising the probability of bank failure in the event of a downturn in global financial flows which 
became a disturbing reality in 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Bank credit to the private sector in Bulgaria has been growing very rapidly in excess of 20% in 
real terms since 2003 in line with the dynamics of credit growth in a number of Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) in recent years.  Several studies (Cottarelli et al., 2003; Duenwald et al., 
2005; Faure, 2007) focused on the determinants of credit booms in CEECs and concluded that 
such credit dynamics has, in most part, reflected a catching up process to the EU levels and 
required financial deepening consistent with the economic fundamentals.  On the other hand, 
Sorsa et al. (2007) argued that the catch-up has been characterized by an excessive credit growth 
accompanied by a considerable build-up of external macroeconomic vulnerabilities, while 
exposing the banking sectors to new sources of lending risks and credit crises in a number of 
CEECs including Bulgaria.  These studies also noted that similar trends in Asian economies 
proved unsustainable and resulted in financial crises during the 1996-1997 period.  
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Credit growth is not a cause for concern as long as it is reflective of underlying growth 
dynamics of the economy and compatible with a stable macroeconomic and financial framework.  
In the Bulgarian case, strong credit expansion and investment financed through large inflows of 
capital contributed significantly to the real income convergence toward the EU level with an 
average real GDP growth of around 5.4 % in 2003-2007.  Yet, the rapid growth in credit was 
also accompanied by a worsening current account balance which reached 24% of GDP in 2007-
2008, accelerating inflation, and growing systemic risk in banking and hence, casted doubt on its 
future sustainability. 
In a comparative study of banking risks in the CEECs, Sorsa et al., 2007 provides a 
detailed account of the growing bank fragility associated with credit booms and warns against 
potential banking crises in a number of transitional economies.  In particular, authors argue that 
most banks in these countries are foreign affiliates of European parent banks, which channel 
large volumes of foreign savings into these economies to tap into the potentially large profit 
opportunities and tend to under-price credit risks in an attempt to raise overall group profits.  
Hence, although the surge in bank lending is a welcome development as a major source of 
investment and property financing in these economies, fast credit growth conceals several un-
priced risks and unsound bank practices and exposes the banking sector to significant risks of 
non-performing loans that could be a harbinger for potential bank failures if the foreign inflows 
of credit is reversed and the global financial crisis slows down the economic activity as is 
currently projected for Eastern Europe.   
At present, around 90 % of Bulgarian banks are foreign affiliates of Western European 
banks.  These banks acquired domestic banks during the large scale privatization process which 
began after the 1997 financial crisis.  As argued in Erdinç (2003), during the 1997-1999 period, 
the newly privatized banks enhanced their capital base and improved profitability but this came 
at the expense of a significant amount of financial disintermediation which generated a severe 
credit crunch.  The pattern reflected the ongoing risks in the real sector, the new prudent banking 
regulations and overall risk averseness of Bulgarian banks.   
Since 2000, the foreign owned banks of Bulgaria attempted to improve profitability by 
increasing credit to the private sector in Bulgaria, a process which was aided by several factors, 
including the growing global liquidity in search for higher returns, and the robust growth and the 
EU accession prospects of the Central and Eastern European economies.3  These banks 
contributed significantly to the financial deepening and sophistication of the Bulgarian banking 
sector by enhancing their ability to assess credit risks, and channeled large flows of foreign 
capital to private domestic companies and households since 2003.  A new banking legislation 
compatible with the European standards also monitored the soundness of the banking sector.   
Yet, the strong credit growth which followed was deemed excessive by many observers 
and was accompanied by a deterioration of the banks’ capital base and carried the seeds of a 
potential banking crisis in the event of a global downturn and a sudden reversal of foreign credit 
flows.  It was feared that the overwhelming dominance of mostly European owned banks in 
Bulgaria could exacerbate the problem of under-pricing of credit risks in the affiliated banks and 
might create significant financial distress in the banking sector.  Although currently there is no 
alarming trend towards mounting bad loans (non-performing loans are around 5% of total loans), 
fast expansion in credit is generally associated with a growing share of non-performing loans 
(“credit risk”) in the future and may eventually erode banks’ capital base which has displayed a 
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strong downward trend as percentage of assets since 2003.  Besides, despite a number of 
attempts to put a “prudential” brake on the potential banking risks, regulatory measures were 
largely ineffective in reducing the speed of credit growth.  This pattern suggested that these 
banks, driven by high profit motive, managed to circumvent regulations. 
To my knowledge, there is no bank-level empirical study which analyzes the dynamics of 
the credit growth and its impact on bank fragility in the context of the Central and Eastern 
European economies, including Bulgaria.  The latter represents an interesting case as there was a 
rapid transformation of its credit markets from “credit crunch” to “credit boom” in less than half 
a decade. 
This paper presents the first known empirical analysis of micro-level Bulgarian bank data 
that assesses whether rapid credit growth aggravated the problem of bank fragility in this 
emerging transitional economy.  Based on a panel data of Bulgarian banks, it analyzes the 
underlying determinants of their credit supply during 1999-2007 and assesses whether it has 
increased bank fragility by generating strong signs of unsound banking practices.  Fixed effect 
and GMM panel data techniques are employed to quantify banking risks associated with the 
recent credit surge and to assess the likelihood of banking distress based on a number of 
vulnerability indicators.   
In the next section, I discuss the impact of the rapid expansion of credit in Bulgaria on 
macroeconomic developments, level of financial deepening and economic growth to evaluate 
whether it reflects a sustainable boom in line with economic fundamentals.  This section also 
draws attention to several of sources of risks deriving from worsening macroeconomic 
imbalances and increasing fragility in banking.  In section 3, the underlying determinants of 
credit boom are discussed with an emphasis on the bank credit channel literature (the lending 
view), bank competition in the aftermath of foreign entry and aggressive lending practices of 
foreign banks in search of higher profits in this emerging banking market. Section 4 identifies 
various sources of potential distress for the future of Bulgarian banking and evaluates indicators 
of such vulnerability.  Section 5 describes data and econometric methodology, estimates different 
specifications of credit supply equations in the presence of fixed and random effects and finally, 
explores the link between credit and capital base in a partial adjustment framework employing 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. Section 6 provides conclusions. 
 
2. A “Catching Up” or A Credit Bubble?  Sustainability of Credit Expansion 
in Bulgaria 
 
The rapid pace of credit growth in Bulgaria during 2003-2007 attracts considerable 
attention, highlighting the need to better understand the underlying factors driving credit 
dynamics in this new EU member state (as of January 1, 2007).  In this section, I explore the 
relationship between the major macroeconomic developments and the credit boom to assess its 
impact on macroeconomic and financial stability as the country prepares for prospective 
integration into the euro area.   
Literature on credit growth identify lending booms as a manifestation of financial 
development (finance-growth nexus) in emerging economies but also warns against a potential 
credit bubble that could bust in an environment of high financial volatility, increasing fragility in 
the banking sectors and worsening macroeconomic imbalances (Hilbers et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 
2006).  It often considers fast expansion of domestic credit among the leading early indicators of 
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financial crises and banking distress even though the likelihood of a crisis following a lending 
boom is only 20 % (Kaminsky et al., 1998).  
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Q12006 Q22006 Q32006 Q42006 
(% change in real terms)          
GDP 4.0 4.8 4.5 5.6 5.5 5.6 6.6 6.7  
Consumption 4.4 3.6 6.6 5.1 6.8 4.8 6.7 6.7  
Fixed Capital  19.9 9.3 13.9 12.0 19.0 21.4 20.3 15.9  
Industrial Production 2.5 4.7 14.1 17.1 6.7 6.0 6.2 6.7 3.6 
          
(% change)          
Consumer Prices 7.4 5.9 2.3 6.1 5.0 8.0 8.3 6.7 6.1 
Producer Prices 3.6 1.3 4.9 5.9 6.9 8.2 9.9 10.5 8.2 
 
         
(% of GDP)          
Government Surplus -0.6 -0.6 0.0 1.7 3.2 1.6 3.8 5.7 5.1 
M3  42.9 48.0 53.3 60.2 53.4 57.5 61.9 67.0 
Domestic Credit  23.7 29.7 35.9 43.6 39.5 40.2 40.1 44.1 
Claims on govt sector  3.9 2.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.1 -2.0 -4.3 -4.5 
Claims on non-govt 
sector  19.8 27.5 36.8 44.5 39.7 42.2 44.4 48.6 
Claims on Households  4.3 7.2 11.4 16.5 14.9 16.5 17.2 18.9 
Time Deposit Rate (%)  2.99 3.12 3.16 3.25 3.49 3.48 3.45 3.48 
ST Loan Rates (%)  9.18 8.56 8.94 8.67 9.23 9.19 8.68 8.47 
LT Loan Rates (%)  14.25 13.46 12.74 10.92 9.81 9.63 9.70 9.52 
 
         
Current Account -5.6 -2.4 -5.5 -5.8 -11.3 -13.9 -14.3 -14.8 -16.0 
FDI (net) 6.1 6.0 10.4 11.8 10.9 12.4 15.5 14.9 16.6 
Capital and Financial Account 11.1 13.2 12.6 17.6 3.5 11.3 15.6 22.8 
External Debt-Public  48.2 39.9 32.8 24.1 19.4 18.9 19.0 18.4 
External Debt-Private  17.0 20.3 31.4 46.3 46.2 51.4 57.3 60.0 
Short-term Debt  9.2 8.6 13.5 17.9 18.5 20.2 22.2 23.8 
ST Debt/ External Debt  14.1 14.3 21.0 25.4 28.1 28.7 29.0 30.4 
Real Effec. Exc. Rate(97=100) 131.4 140.1 141.9 141.8 146.8 146.1 144.6 149.3 
                    
Source: BNB statistics. 
 
In broad terms, the lending boom in Bulgaria has entailed a fast speed of financial 
deepening and has coincided with a strong pace of economic growth induced by a surge in 
investment and consumption financed through large inflows of foreign capital.  Starting from a 
low base of financial intermediation in 1997-1999, when domestic credit to GDP ratio was only 
20.8%, private credit to GDP ratio rose to 47.5% in 2006.4  In the meantime, the country 
maintained an average growth of real GDP between 2004 and 2006 of over 6%.  On the demand 
side, rising employment, real sector profitability and incomes, along with prospective EU 
accession and low international interest rates provided the key impetus for private sector’s credit 
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demand.  On the supply side, intensified bank competition lowered interest spreads, and 
confidence in the foreign-controlled banking sector along with prudential bank regulations 
surged the deposit base of banks, raising the broad money, M3 to GDP ratio from 43% to 67% 
during 2002-2006.  
In an empirical study of bank credit growth to the private sector in 15 countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Cottarelli et al. (2003) study the credit to GDP developments since the mid-
1990s and conclude that rapid credit was broadly consistent with the economic fundamentals and 
structural characteristics of these countries that generally seem to fit the pattern of a catching up 
movement rather than an unsustainable credit bubble.  The results for Bulgaria indicate that the 
private credit-to-GDP ratio at 48.6% in 2006 is still below its long-term equilibrium value and 
hence, and the current boom in credit is reflective of this significant potential for catching up 
(credit-GDP ratio is still lower than its long-run fundamental value) but the pace of credit growth 
since 2003 has been in excess of 35% on average in Bulgaria and this fast pace is worrisome.5  
The authors warn that if lending rises too rapidly compared to its trend and the speed of 
convergence implied by the equilibrium model, it can generate unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalances and could trigger a systemic credit crisis, if banks get increasingly vulnerable to bad 
loans and low capital base.  
Episodes of credit booms can entail three major risks for macroeconomic and banking 
stability and as such, generate significant cause for concern (Faure, 2007): First, a credit boom 
could potentially increase macroeconomic risks, by triggering massive current account 
imbalances.  An upward shift in domestic demand exerts strong pressure on prices in asset (real 
estate boom) and goods (inflation) .i.e. “macro risk”. Second, it may aggravate risks to the 
banking sector due to potential deterioration of asset quality i.e. “credit risk.” And third, if credit 
booms are largely financed through foreign capital inflows, they may generate huge foreign 
exchange exposure i.e. “foreign currency risk”.  A sudden reversal of foreign capital inflows 
could also risk the stability of the foreign currency regime, while creating financial distress in the 
banking sector if economy slows down.  These risks are mutually reinforcing, creating boom-
bust cycles in credit and asset markets. 
Indeed, Bulgaria displays signs of worsening macroeconomic balances, greater exposure 
to foreign exchange risk and increasing fragility in its banking sector against the background of 
visible overheating in the economy as captured by accelerating inflation, booming property 
prices6 and widening current account deficit. These trends have been emerging due to an 
investment and consumption boom financed through a strong credit and wage growth (Table 1).  
Inflation in 2007 surged to over 12% from 6% in the previous year. After reaching almost 15% 
of GDP in 2005, the current account deficit ballooned to an astonishing 22% as credit growth 
remained strong in 2006-2007.  Although such a trend is generally considered symptomatic of 
countries at this stage of development, the worsening current account balance is a sign of serious 
overheating in the economy and mounting macroeconomic risks. A future slow-down or reversal 
of FDI may pose a threat in the future for the financing of this deficit.  There is econometric 
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evidence that the credit boom in Bulgaria has been a significant factor in the deterioration of the 
trade balance despite favorable movements in terms of trade (Duenwald et al., 2005) although 
tighter fiscal policy moderated its impact somewhat.   
But there are also several mitigating factors such as the credibility of its currency board 
which pegs the Bulgarian leva against the euro, and its success in maintaining fiscal surpluses.  
According to the World Bank’s latest EU8+2 Report, the country provides ample coverage for its 
current account deficit through inflows of FDI.  But the coverage declined to 103.2% of current 
account deficit in 2006, a sharp fall from 243.5% in 2002.7  Unlike many other CEEs, Bulgaria is 
also one of the few countries that successfully managed its structural fiscal balances. Bulgarian 
authorities8 have been remarkably successful in maintaining fiscal prudence, and keeping public 
finances under control, generating a surplus in the order of 2.4% of GDP in 2004 and 3% of GDP 
in 2005 (Table 1).  This seems to be the essence of policy credibility that the authorities 
preserved despite the challenges they faced because of rapid credit growth and overheating of the 
economy.  The currency board has also been largely instrumental in underpinning Bulgaria’s 
monetary stability and credibility but the currency peg to the euro in the face of higher Bulgarian 
inflation than its trading partners has led to real appreciation of the domestic currency, further 
fueling imports.  Although lending to the household sector grew rapidly in the form of 
consumption and mortgage loans at around 15% on average during 2003-2006, the fastest credit 
growth was generated for lending to the private sector, financing investment in physical capital 
with a favorable impact on productive capacity. 
The corporate foreign currency debt in Bulgaria is about 60% of GDP attesting to the 
significant exposures to foreign exchange risks in view of the widening current account deficit.9 
Lending in foreign currency constituted 17% of loans to households and 64% of lending to 
corporations, partly because of the low interest spreads on such loans.  Although deposit 
accumulation rather than excessive borrowing from abroad mostly financed the credit boom 
intermediated through the banking sector, the latter’s share is rising and they are often un-
hedged.  In many other CEEs, attracted foreign funds outpaced deposit creation to finance credit 
growth in recent years.  Although Bulgarian banks managed to keep their foreign currency 
exposure at a manageable level so far, since 2004, foreign currency loans have exceeded foreign 
currency deposits by a relatively moderate margin, implying that long-term borrowing by banks 
from parent banks in Europe began to be used to finance foreign currency loans, exposing the 
banking sector to indirect foreign exchange risk.  Real appreciation of the Bulgarian lev also 
encouraged borrowing in foreign currency for both banks and the private sector (Table 1).  
Overall, these developments could be strong signs of a potentially unsustainable credit expansion 
in Bulgaria.   
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3. Determinants of Credit Boom in Bulgaria: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Factors 
 
Generally speaking, the ongoing credit boom in Bulgaria reflects a “catching up” from a 
depressed level of post-crisis bank intermediation and hence, a process of financial deepening.  It 
also reflects a mix of supply and demand factors, especially a surge in the supply of credit as the 
system started off from a very low level of financial intermediation.  The period 1997-1999 was 
dubbed as a period of “credit crunch” by Erdinç (2003) as it coincided with a period of a sharp 
drop in financial intermediation after the implementation of the currency board in 1997, 
reflecting banks’ aversion to credit risks in an uncertain institutional and macroeconomic 
environment.  Since then, Bulgaria registered sound growth and banks were restructured after 
their ownership was transferred to foreign banks which engaged in balance sheet rehabilitation 
and enhanced capital base. Consequently, banks were encouraged to expand credit since 2000.10  
A variety of credit channel models consider how changes in the financial position of 
banks (bank lending channel) and borrowers (balance sheet channel) affect the supply of credit in 
an economy.  In Bulgaria, the entry of foreign banks in search of lucrative markets improved 
loan screening and monitoring functions of the banks with a favorable shift in their loan supply 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Banks assessed that firm level creditworthiness has been improving, 
and because of greater expertise in credit assessment and monitoring skills due to foreign 
ownership, credit making has been perceived as profitable again after 1999.  Rising collateral 
values due to booming real estate markets also improved the banks’ ability to supply credit, 
improving the value of credit guarantees.  Banks’ ability to fund loan expansion has been 
boosted by foreign capital inflows, mostly through the banking system in the midst of high 
global liquidity, low interest rates and strong confidence in the Bulgarian economy given its 
prospective accession to the European Union.  In addition to these factors, increasing reliance of 
banks on long term foreign borrowing that supplemented the growth of the deposit base and 
intense competition for market share suggest that the credit boom has been mostly supply-driven.   
On the demand size, the positive shock to supply was readily matched by growing 
demand from both private sector and households.  Rising profits associated with solid economic 
growth and prospective accession to the European Union prompted businesses to expand 
investment and credit demand.  Consumer and mortgage credit also took off from relatively 
depressed levels as rising incomes and property prices increased households’ ability to service 
debt. This process was also facilitated through increasing flexibility of banks in offering new 
banking products as part of aggressive bank competition.  
Yet, banks mostly cater to large and established domestic and foreign corporations when 
lending (cherry-picking) and others that are small and young are still perceived as high risks.  
Hence, the small and medium size corporations have still limited access to credit in Bulgaria 
with less than 5% share in total lending and are perceived to be notoriously credit constrained.11  
This also supports the view that lending was supply-driven.  Given that the credit markets in 
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Bulgaria are still generating only limited amount of funding for enterprises, it can be argued that 
the credit boom reflected a shift in loan supply by banks more so than the shift in demand for 
credit by firms and households.  Hence, there was a drop in the scale and extent of credit 
rationing rather than an adjustment of credit supply to a greater demand for credit.  
The argument that large outward shift of credit supply relative to the shift of demand 
under conditions of persistent excess demand for credit help mitigate the well-known 
identification problem with respect to the relative shifts in demand or supply of bank loans in 
estimating credit equations.  In section 5, the credit supply equations are estimated based on this 
assumption to disentangle demand and supply effects.  In support of this assumption, it should be 
also noted that loan-total debt quantity mix12 has increased while the interest rate spreads came 
down from over 8% to 4% during the credit boom, providing further evidence for a positive 
supply shock.13   
 
4. Does Credit Boom Increase Bank Fragility?  Signs of Vulnerability among 
Bulgarian Banks 
 
The lending boom in Bulgaria accelerated in the aftermath of a massive transfer of bank 
ownership to foreign parent banks located mostly in Europe through takeovers and coincided 
with a period of intense bank competition for market share and enhanced profits in this 
potentially lucrative banking market.  It also represented a dramatic shift towards bank 
intermediation and financial deepening in the aftermath of a deep financial crisis and credit 
crunch of 1997-1999.  Since then, Bulgarian banks improved efficiency, enhanced profitability 
and competition against a stringent regulatory framework with prudential regulations since the 
enactment of the new banking law adopted in June 1997.  The institutional framework for the 
financial sector- in terms of prudential regulations has been quite adequate in Bulgaria, reducing 
risks for a possible banking crisis.14  
Bulgarian banks are considered well-capitalized and liquid with relatively small level of 
non-performing loans (5-6% in 2007)15, but the ratio can easily keep pace with the growth in 
credit.16 Domestic lending is primarily financed through domestic deposits, without excessive 
resort to external financing through foreign inflows. Foreign banks which hold a dominant 
position in the sector has arguably better management and oversight with expertise in loan 
monitoring and evaluation that could potentially mitigate problems of credit quality.   
Easy access to external finance of foreign banks, coupled with their eagerness to make 
profits in their newly acquired foreign subsidiaries and to expand market share in a potentially 
lucrative market boost their credit supply.  In Bulgaria, “this aggressive stance in loan portfolio 
expansion has been actively encouraged by the banks’ foreign parents, located in relatively less 
profitable mature markets, to gain market share, thereby contributing to the acceleration of 
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credit” (Duenwald et al., 2005).  The drive of the European parent banks to boost their overall 
group profitability with high profits from the emerging Southeastern European banking markets 
may exacerbate the problem of systematic risk under-pricing, especially in a weak institutional 
setting regarding credit quality (Sorsa et al., 2007).  Parent banks set high return on equity (ROE) 
targets for their affiliates between 20 to 25%, compared with an EU average of 14%.  Local 
managers may have an incentive to generate rapid loan growth while downplaying risks and thus 
provisions. Hence, fast credit growth may surge nonperforming loans as banks’ ability to assess 
risks become overstretched, affecting the quality of portfolios.17 
 
Table 2: Selected Indicators of Bulgarian Banking System 
 
  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(% of GDP)           
     
      
Total Credit 20.8 15.6 15.3 17.8 20.2 23.7 27.1 36.1 43.8 44.0 
Deposits 27.6 22.5 27.1  32.2 34.9 39.3 51.0 60.6 60.4 
 
   
 
      
(% change)           
           
Assets     25.0 19.1 19.0 43.8 31.8 17.0 
Total Credit     55.4 45.5 55.4 47.3 33.1 4.1 
Credit to Firms     35.0 45.6 50.2 38.1 21.7 -9.3 
Credit to HHs     46.3 45.3 75.0 79.3 63.0 43.8 
Deposits     34.3 18.1 20.5 43.7 30.1 12.0 
           
(%)           
           
Capital Adequacy 4.3 7.9 10.4  31.3 25.2 22.2 16.1 15.2 16.0 
Capital to Assets 22.8 23.4 18.9 18.6 16.1 13.3 18.9 15.0 14.5 12.9 
NPLs to Total 
Loans 17.5 9.2 9.4 6.6 3.3 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.7 5.0 
Provisions to 
NPLs     61.6 59.6 50.0 48.5 45.3 45.3 
Return on Assets  0.7 2 1.8 2.9 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.6 
Return on Equity     21.9 17.9 22.7 20.6 22.1 25.8 
                      
Source: BNB banking reports, and author’s calculations. 
 
According to Sorsa et al. (2007), this under-pricing may be compounded by poor 
accounting and auditing standards, unreliable financial disclosure and incomplete credit 
registries, implying that data on creditworthiness of borrowers are often misleading or 
insufficient.  This mechanism can lead to a potential build-up of credit risk in banks’ balance 
sheets, eventually triggering a credit crisis, if bank credit quality deteriorates, non-performing 
loans build up and bank capital erodes.  Indeed, the upward surge in the return on equity (ROE) 
seems to be reflective of the downward trend in the capital base, and declining amount of loan 
loss provisions as percent of loans may be consistent with inadequate level of provisioning- a 
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pattern consistent with a tendency to downplay risks and even unsound bank practices.  As can 
be seen from Table 2, there is a disturbing trend towards lower levels of capital adequacy ratios 
and the capital to asset ratios have been consistently declining over the 2001-2006 period.  In the 
meantime, consistent with the rapid pace of credit growth, there is some evidence of rising credit 
risks as revealed by the increasing amount of non-performing loans as percentage of loans and 
capital.  
Moreover, according to Sorsa et al. (2007), centralization of risk management in parent 
banks may focus on the overall risks of the entire operations, and may underestimate the risk 
exposures of their affiliates which represent a small share of total operations.18  Hence, foreign 
banks may contribute to a potential credit risk build up though mispricing of risks and by relying 
on foreign funding to finance credit expansion, they could generate large parent-affiliate 
exposures and vulnerability to a sudden stop or reversals of capital inflows.  The recent subprime 
lending crises in the US is an example of a bust caused by mispricing of risks and shows that 
even in sophisticated financial markets, overly aggressive lending behavior may induce unsound 
banking practices, leading to mounting credit risks and eventual bursting of the bubble in the 
economy.  
In view of mounting pressures on macroeconomic balances, and a potential banking 
distress associated with too rapid lending growth, Bulgarian regulatory authorities took a host of 
measures to curb the credit growth and contain a potential systemic crisis in banking in the face 
of mounting macroeconomic and prudential risks with only limited results in 2006-2007.  In 
2005, credit controls in the form of marginal reserve requirements on excessive credit expansion 
exceeding a certain limit and on banks' foreign borrowing (including from their parent banks) 
were adopted in addition to fiscal tightening and moral suasion.19  The authorities also increased 
reserve requirements from 8 to 12% in September 2007 and implemented tighter loan 
classification and provisioning, risk-weighted capital requirements, lower loan-to-value ratios 
and collateral rules.  The Bank has been closely monitoring the banking sector dynamics.  Yet, 
such measures proved largely ineffective as banks found alternative routes to circumvent 
regulations by diverting credit to less supervised channels like their own leasing companies. 
As such, presence of foreign banks in Bulgaria is no guarantee for prudent banking 
practices and the relative ineffectiveness of new prudential regulations in curbing credit growth 
in 2005-2006 confirm the existence of strong incentives for circumventing regulations by these 
aggressive banks.20  Without downplaying the importance of effective prudential regulations and 
bank supervision, it can be argued that probably one of the most effective instruments of 
ensuring prudent behavior derives from a radical change in risk perceptions that could induce 
these banks to re-price their exposure in these emerging markets.  Foreign banks increase the risk 
of contagion (Sorsa et al., 2007).  A shock in the region or in the home country cause parents to 
                                                 
18
 Parent banks may not effectively validate the risk pricing method (relying on local managers’ judgment) applied 
in their subsidiaries. Consolidated supervision at the group level may also focus on risks for parent banks rather than 
the impact of a wide range of shocks on affiliates.  The foreign banks in Bulgaria represent only a small part of the 
overall portfolio of the big European financial conglomerates such as BNP Paribas, Raiffeisen, Societe General, 
Unicredito, ING (parent banks).  
19
 These measures included the introduction of quantitative limitations on the increase of credit portfolios and 
additional required reserves for the banks violating the restrictions.  In October 2006, BNB decided to fully abolish 
the administrative restrictions on credit growth, and the decision was put in force from January 1, 2007.  
20
  Under the Currency Board regime, bank rescue operations are against the law (along with lender of last resort 
function for the BNB) and given the aggressive lending behavior of banks, vigilant bank supervision is necessary at 
all times to reduce the probability of bank failures in case a system-wide banking crisis hits. 
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change the policy of their Bulgarian affiliates, no matter how well they perform.21  The full-
blown US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 and early 2008 seem to modify risk perceptions 
among Bulgarian banks.  Following a general slow-down in capital inflows, banks recently 
increased the lending rates as of March 2008, a sign of reduced willingness for crediting.  
Moreover, foreign subsidiary banks in Bulgaria may be expected to be supported 
financially by their parent banks in case of financial distress such that possibility of bailouts by 
the foreign parent bank increases (moral hazard problem).22 But how likely this is in the event of 
system-wide crisis is open to discussion.  Nothing guarantees that a parent bank will help its 
Bulgarian affiliate in the case of crisis.  As a case in point, when Croatian Rijecka bank suffered 
large losses in 2002, its parent bank, the German Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, did not 
rescue its affiliate. 
 
5. Data and Econometric Methodology 
 
In this section, I assess whether Bulgarian banks practice sound lending practices and 
measure several indicators of bank fragility by employing panel estimation techniques.  Is there 
evidence for growing risks of banking distress associated with the credit surge in Bulgaria? All 
variables in the model have been created from the balance sheets and income statements of 30 
Bulgarian banks (entire commercial banking sector in Bulgaria) published by the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB). All data are quarterly over the 1999-2006 based on the availability of 
published reports.23  
 
5.1 Determinants of Credit Supply and Their Expected Signs 
 
I rely on the model of credit supply by banks under credit rationing and asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990) and assume that there is 
excess demand for bank credit in Bulgaria during the period under consideration.  According to 
these models, supply of credit depends positively on banks’ deposit and capital base.  Especially, 
prudent banks expand credit only if they have greater capital base to cover potential loan losses.  
Greater the informational asymmetries regarding borrowers’ creditworthiness, greater the capital 
base required to expand loans.  
The following financial ratios and dummy variables are included in the regression 
equations to assess this theory: (dependent variable) credit – logarithm of bank loans to non-
financial institutions, cap –a natural logarithm of bank capital which includes owners’ equity, 
reserves, and current profit/loss, deposit – logarithm of bank deposits, ltliab –logarithm of long 
term debt borrowed by banks as a measure of foreign inflows of capital into the banking sector, 
fown- a dummy variable indicating the year when a particular bank was acquired by a foreign 
owner, size – logarithm of the bank asset which measures the size of the bank, nintincome-  
logarithm of net interest income as a measure of bank profitability, lprov – a logarithm of net 
                                                 
21
 For instance, after suffering capital losses because of a drop in the stock market, the Japanese banks reduced 
lending in their US affiliates more than at home.  
22
  The Banking Act permits the Central Bank to provide liquidity to commercial banks only if a general banking 
crisis is imminent.  Otherwise, the BNB does not get involved in bank rescue operations. 
23
 The data could be extended to cover the year 2007 once the detailed statistics are published by the BNB.  Given 
the continuous expansion of credit in Bulgaria during 2007-2008, the results of this analysis are expected to be 
strengthened with the arrival of new data.  
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loan loss provisions, cr10 – concentration ratio accounting for the 10 biggest banks in terms of 
assets, loandep - loan to deposit ratio, fowncap1 –  the product of fown and cap lagged one 
period, lprovcap4 –  the logarithm of bank capital and bank provisions lagged four periods, 
d2004, d2005 – dummy variables to assess the effectiveness of regulations enacted in 2004 and 
2005 by the BNB in order to curb the ongoing credit boom.  These dummy variables have a 
value of 0 before the particular year, and 1 from the year onwards. 
I expect cap to have a positive sign in credit equations: If banks take calculated risks in 
expanding credit and are careful in lending then greater amount of capital must be the basis for 
expanding credit. A negative coefficient, by contrast, may indicate excessive risk taking due to 
moral hazard among banks.  I use size to account for differences in bank size as measured by 
total assets. Larger banks tend to make more credits than smaller ones- because of their branch 
networks, and hence, ability to collect deposits.  Moreover, size may be an indicator of the 
bank’s access to long-term borrowing and capital. Thus, it is expected to have a positive sign.  
Alternatively, I use deposit as a measure of size, or to account for the significance of 
deposits as opposed to alternative forms of financing such as ltliab (mostly external borrowing 
from parent banks).  Since both boost the ability of banks to make loans, they are expected to 
have positive signs in credit equations.  
Since banks in Bulgaria are primarily foreign owned, the Bulgarian affiliates have the 
chance to receive financial injections from their foreign owners.  The availability of such easy-
to-acquire financing plays a role in the decision of the bank how much credit to extend. 
Furthermore, the ability of multinational banks to move capital in and out from Bulgaria can be a 
serious source of instability (Weller, 2001).  When mother banks have problems on other 
regional or home markets, liabilities to mother banks may increase Bulgarian banks’ risks 
associated with foreign currency liabilities (“contagion effect”).  Since the long-term borrowing 
of Bulgarian banks is primarily from their mother banks, greater reliance on such borrowing may 
increase their risk to such contagion effects while financing a credit boom, potentially reversible 
when global markets get hit by adverse financial shocks.  
Financial liberalization framework suggests that entry of foreign banks enhances overall 
efficiency of the domestic banking sector by improving market discipline, importing foreign 
expertise in lending, and managerial know-how while increasing bank capital through foreign 
infusions of fresh capital (McKinnon, 1993; Shaw, 1973).  Yet, along with better credit 
evaluation skills, foreign banks require higher returns from their subsidiaries located abroad and 
set higher profit targets for such markets than those prevalent in their home markets.  Thus, I 
conjecture that foreign ownership is associated with aggressive lending and hence, fown is 
expected to have a positive effect on credit making.24  Foreign banks are also expected to be 
better in loan evaluation and credit monitoring, potentially having a positive impact on the credit 
supply.  I also include nintincome as the true measure of bank profitability (rather than ROA) 
which is expected to have a positive effect on credit making.  This is because the more profitable 
banks get in lending, the greater their incentives for making more new loans. 
The concentration ratio, cr10, shows the level of competition in the banking sector. The 
higher the concentration ratio, less is the level of competition in the banking industry and 
consequently, the incentive for expanding credit is reduced. The banking sector in Bulgaria is 
still highly concentrated despite the trend towards greater competition with the entry of foreign 
banks. Thus, high concentration may mitigate the aggressiveness of Bulgarian banks, having a 
negative effect on loan supply.  Thus, I expect cr10 to have a negative coefficient.  
                                                 
24
 Those banks with foreign ownership stake in excess of 85% as captured by the date of privatization are included. 
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The prudential regulations enacted in 2004 and 2005 took the form of marginal reserve 
requirements and credit controls and are expected to put a brake on credit growth.  They are 
captured by d2004 and d2005 dummies and if effective, they should have a negative sign, 
implying reduced speed of credit growth.  Another way to check if banks follow regulations is 
through loan-loss provisions.  I expect loan-loss provisions, lprov, to have a positive sign as 
greater amount of loans require more provisioning if banks appropriately follow the prudential 
regulations and set aside part of their income for potential loan losses.  On the other hand, lagged 
values of this variable might have a negative effect on credit as an increase in loan losses as 
captured by lprov in the previous periods can constrain banks’ incentives for credit making in 
the future.  The loan to deposit ratio, loandep, is an indicator of the depth of the domestic 
banking sector, and thus reflect the profit opportunities for multinational banks (Weller, 2001).  
A relatively well-developed banking sector with expertise in credit making increases the ability 
of banks to transform deposits to loans. The greater this value, the greater the bank’s willingness 
to extend loans per unit of deposits. 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Fixed Effect and Random Effect Estimation  
 
In Table 3, I present the fixed effects (FE) estimation results without time dummies along 
with random effects and FE with AR(1) serial correlation.  The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the bank credit, credit.  Based on the F-test, I reject the hypothesis of pooled 
estimation in favor of a fixed effect estimation using Eviews.25  This implies that a significant 
amount of bank heterogeneity is present among the Bulgarian banks during the sample period. 
The FE approach can incorporate both time and cross-section bank dummies in estimation. Time 
dummies capture the common set of macroeconomic and policy changes (e.g. regulations) that 
affect all banks over the sample period.  Lag values of the regressors are used in estimation to 
mitigate possible endogeneity problem between credit and other variables, some in the form of 
interactions, under the assumption of well-behaved disturbances.  
 
crediti,t= α + β1capi,t-1 + β3depositi,t-1 + β4ltliabi,t-1 + β5lprovi,t-1 + β6sizei,t + β7nintincomei,t-1 + 
β8cr10t+ β9 fown*capi,t-1 + β10lprov*cap i,t-1 + ui,t      (1) 
 
where  
 
I tested for the significance of the cross section and time dummies using the Likelihood 
Ratio test and found evidence for cross section effects but not time effects (Table 3).  This was 
followed by Hausman specification test for random versus fixed effects which favored the fixed 
effects esimation.   
Additional tests for fixed effects have been performed by employing Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan LM tests for random effects using Stata software.  But contrary to the earlier 
findings, both tests favored random effects. This inconsistency may be due to the unbalanced 
nature of the panel with missing observations for some years.   
                                                 
25
  As is well-known, estimates of the pooled are biased if bank-specific effects are present and are inefficient if 
disturbances are serially correlated or heteroscedastic (Baltagi, 2005). 
),0(~ 2ηση Nitittiitu ηλα ++=
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In Table 3, DW statistic for FE estimation indicates the presence of serial correlation of 
order one.26 Both FE and RE estimation results are still consistent but inefficient in the presence 
of serial correlation (Baltagi, 2005) and serial correlation may reflect persistence and dynamic 
structure for the credit equations as well as trend in the data.  As a robustness check for the 
parameter estimates, FE estimation results are reported in the same table under the assumption of 
first-order serial correlation, AR(1).  
 
Table 3: Fixed and Random Effect Estimation  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
1 FE 
credit 
2 RE 
credit 
3 FE with AR(1) 
credit 
    
cap(-1) -0.0818**  
 
 
-0.0846*** -0.1016** 
deposit(-1) 0.11399*** 
 
 
0.10647*** 0.1174*** 
ltliab(-1) 0.01375 
 
 
0.02253** 0.0261* 
size 0.90550*** 0.92828*** 0.9861*** 
lprov(-1) -0.02112 -0.03304** -0.0401* 
cr10 0.54583 -5.6892*** -5.7508 
nintincome(-1) -0.025592 -0.00278 0.0401 
fown*cap(-1) 0.02567*** 0.02476*** 0.0266*** 
lprov*cap(-1) 0.00468*** 0.00293** -0.00133 
Constant -0.7700 3.9187*** 3.267 
Dummies   time and cross section no cross section 
Obs (Unbalanced Panel) 292 292 170 
Adj. R2 0.9469 0.9471 0.9542 
F-statistic 80.99*** 580.67*** 96.30*** 
DW-statistic 2.403 2.030 2.249 
Hausman test ------ FE*** ------ 
Likelihood Ratio Test No time effects  No CS effects 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. 
 
                                                 
26
  Stata reports the modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistic as 0.7293865 and Baltagi-Wu LBI as 
1.1246718 for xtregar fixed effect regression wih the lbi option, and confirms the presence of first-order serial 
correlation.    
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In all three specifications, size and deposit are highly significant with positive signs and 
strongly influence the credit supplied by Bulgarian banks which is consistent with earlier 
findings in the literature.  Long-term borrowing, ltliab also has the expected positive sign but 
only significant for RE and FE under AR(1) estimations.  A comparison of the coefficient values 
also indicates that deposits are more important than long-term borrowing from affiliated banks 
for Bulgarian subsidiaries in supplying credit.27   
On the other hand, if banks with smaller loan loss provisions tend to be more aggressive 
in lending, the negative sign for lprov may indicate moral hazard and excessive risk taking.  An 
aggressive bank, abiding by the loan-loss provision norms, should increase provisions in line 
with its loans. For instance, in the US banks, the relationship between credit and loan loss 
provisions is positive as reported by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) as an indication of sound 
banking practices.  Hence, to disentangle these effects, I also use the interactive variable, 
lprov*cap and observe the sign to be positive and significant in both FE and RE estimation (but 
negative and insignificant for FE with AR(1)).  This means that better capitalized Bulgarian 
banks suffer less from moral hazard problem and increase their provisions along with their 
credit. 
Capital variable, cap, is highly significant in all three equations but has a negative sign.  
In several specifications, fown was also found to be positive and highly significant but when 
interacted with capital, it turns out to be insignificant.  In Table 3, fown*cap is positive and 
significant, implying that foreign owned banks tend to expand credit, along with their capital 
base.  Moreover, I find that d2004 and d2005 are insignificant with positive signs, which imply 
that prudential measures were largely ineffective in controlling credit growth in Bulgaria during 
this period.28   
A surprising result is that bank profitability has no bearing on credit supply in Bulgaria: 
nintincome is insignificant with a negative sign in two out of three specifications, contrary to 
expectations.  Similarly, cr10 is found to have the expected negative effect on credit but is 
insignificant.  Along with loandep, several other measures such as the nominal GDP, FDI flows 
and inflation rates were used in order to capture potential demand effects but were found to be 
insignificant in estimation and were dropped in final specifications. 
 
5.2.3 Fixed Effect Estimation with Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
To capture persistence, fixed estimation in levels and first differences were carried out 
with lagged credit as an additional regressor.  Both fixed and random effect estimators are biased 
in dynamic specifications including a lagged dependent variable even with exogenous regressors 
and serially uncorrelated disturbances as lagged dependent variable does introduce serial 
correlation into panel estimation (Bond, 2002).  So, the results should be interpreted with 
caution.  As a robustness check on coefficient signs, the results are presented in Table 3.  In 
addition to significant persistence in the credit variable, the signs and significance of most 
variables included in the model remain the same with the exception of lprov*cap and ltliab 
which turn insignificant in this specification. 
                                                 
27
  This somewhat exposes Bulgarian banks to the risks associated with foreign currency liabilities as borrowing is in 
Euros. Moreover, about 60%  of deposits are denominated in foreign currency which adds to the foreign currency 
exposure of banks.  
28
  Some banks are known to be creative in concealing their credit through their affiliated leasing companies to 
evade credit regulations. 
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Table 4: Fixed Effect Estimation with Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
  FE 
credit 
 
    
credit(-1) 
 0.0756  
credit(-2) 
 0.0622**  
cap(-1) 
 -0.1026***  
deposit(-1) 
 0.1038***  
size 
 0.9498***  
lprov(-1) 
 - 0.0570***  
cr10  -0.6911  
nintincome(-1) 
 - 0.0802  
ltliab(-1) 
 0.0080  
lprov*cap(-1) 
 - 0.0002  
fown*cap(-1) 
 0.0210***  
constant   - 0.4582 
 
Obs (Unbalanced Panel)  252 
 
Adj. R2  
 
0.9444 
 
DW-statistic 
 
1.9843 
 
Hausman test 
 
FE*** 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. 
 
5.2.4 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation 
 
According to the capital buffer theory extended by (Milne and Whaley, 2001), banks first 
increase capital and decrease risk following an increase in the regulatory minimum, and after a 
period of adjustment to build capital buffers, they increase both capital and risk.  Hence, for 
banks with low capital buffers, adjustments in credit (asset risk) and capital are negatively 
related and for banks with high capital buffers they are positively related.  The theory effectively 
endogenizes the decisions to acquire capital and expand credit in the context of adjustment to a 
target level of capital and credit.  In the context of Bulgarian banking, the credit crunch period 
(1997-1999) has coincided with the former type of behavior when banks accumulated capital and 
curtailed lending in the aftermath of the new Banking Law (1997) which imposed higher 
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minimum capital requirements.  According to this model, during the credit boom, Bulgarian 
banks should have expanded credit and capital simultaneously.  This positive relationship is 
based on the assumption that banks have reached their desired capital buffers beyond which they 
set aside more capital for credit risks.   
Another study by Helmann et al. (2000) argues that, in the face of competition which 
erodes banks’ charter value, banks decrease capital and increase asset risk, while increasing 
fragility in banking.  Similarly, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predict that in the presence of 
diminishing risk aversion, risk averse (sound) banks with higher capital base tend to increase 
their credit risk.  At the extreme, banks may have an incentive to decrease capital and increase 
asset (credit) risk, evading the risk-weighted capital requirements.  This pattern of bank behavior 
is well-known as the moral hazard problem and is based on expectations of a “bail-out” by the 
parent banks or regulatory agencies (Merton, 1977).29  The relative ineffectiveness of the 
prudential measures employed by the Bulgarian authorities to curb credit growth and contain 
potential banking risks during the 2005-2006 period may confirm the aggressive behavior of 
Bulgarian banks in search of higher profits and possible excessive risk taking. 
Clearly, these theories generate rivaling predictions on the relationship between banks’ 
choices of capital and credit which can only be resolved empirically.  Hence, a finding of a 
negative relationship between capital and credit could be attributed to a combination of the 
following factors: a) Bulgarian banks were inefficiently over-capitalized during the crunch 
period and attempted to improve return on equity by reducing credit-capital ratio, b) interbank 
rivalry prompted banks to improve profitability by reducing credit-capital ratio, and c) the banks 
were increasingly engaged risk-taking behavior (diminishing risk-aversion) and financed a credit 
boom while reducing capital.  At the extreme, this type of bank behavior could eventually erode 
the capital base if risks are mis-priced and the size of non-performing loans requires significant 
write-offs.  Bank fragility and the likelihood of bank failures increase, potentially destabilizing 
the entire banking sector.  
To evaluate if Bulgarian banks engage in excessive risk taking during the credit boom 
period, I specify two partial adjustment equations for credit and capital to capture the 
simultaneity between capital and credit decisions.  This framework assumes that banks aim at 
establishing optimum capital and risk levels but only gradually and partially adjust to these target 
levels due to adjustment costs.   
 
∆crediti,t= α(crediti,t*- crediti,t-1)+ β∆ capi,t + ui,t      (2) 
 
∆capi,t= θ(capi,t*- capi,t-1)+ δ∆crediti,t  + wi,t       (3) 
 
where α and θ are speeds of adjustment, and optimum levels are indicated with stars.  Hence, 
actual adjustments in credit and cap at time t are a function of the optimum (target) levels of the 
variables in addition to random disturbances captured by ui,t  and wi,t.  As is standard in the 
literature, optimal levels are unobservable for both variables and are modeled as functions of 
other bank specific variables.  In the presence of bank heterogeneity, both disturbances ui,t  and 
wi,t should contain a cross-section bank specific effects, say µi and υi as in equation (1).  
 
 
                                                 
29
  Merton (1977) shows that banks have an incentive to decrease capital-to-asset ratios and to increase asset risk, 
thereby increasing the probability of default and bankruptcy.  
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Table 5: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation for Credit Equation 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
1 Eviews 
∆Credit(one-step) 
2 Stata 
∆Credit(one-step) 
3 Stata 
∆Credit (two-step) 
    
credit(-1) -1.092587*** ∆credit(-1)  .1853768*** .1889766*** 
∆cap -0.077121** ∆cap           -.0130653 -.015292** 
deposit(-1) 0.065675 ∆deposit     .0286353 .0413763 
ltliab(-1) 0.044676** ∆ltliab         .0446876*** .0632756*** 
size 0.907933*** ∆size           .7580138*** .702656*** 
lprov(-2) -0.036197 ∆lprov        -.0085667     -.0107614*** 
 
   
nintincome(-1) 0.150072** ∆nintinc       .0210227* .0199231*** 
fown*cap(-1) insig insig insig 
lprov*cap(-4) insig insig insig 
Constant -0.713274  Constant   -.0033069              .0002522 
Obs (Unbalanced Panel) 83 385 385 
Adj. R2 0.973142   
DW-statistic 1.847911   
AR(1)-AR(3) All significant at 5% AR(1) sign, AR(2) insig AR(1) sign, AR(2) insig 
Sargan Test (p-values)  Significant at 1% Insignificant 
Cross section dummies yes yes yes 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test.  
 
Since first differencing of the relevant variables eliminate the bank specific cross section 
effects, µi and υi, both random and fixed effect estimators are biased in the presence of lagged 
dependent variables or endogenous variables as regressors.  Hence, Arellano-Bond GMM 
method for the estimation of these equations has been employed using the lagged values of the 
dependent variable as instruments.  GMM takes into account the dynamic structure of the panel 
data and permits a better understanding of dynamics of adjustment in the panel framework.  High 
persistence and trend in the data for cap and credit variables may suggest the existence of a unit 
root.  To check for their stationarity, I conduct the Levin, Lin & Chu as well as Im, Pesaran and 
Shin tests for panel unit roots and reject the existence of unit roots. 
I estimate the GMM model both with Eviews and Stata under alternative specifications. 
The Sargan’s test for over-identifying restrictions confirms the validity of the instruments to 
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avoid possible misspecification of the model (p-values reported in Table 5) and the presence of 
AR(1) but not AR(2) is also verified as expected.30  Two step GMM which is more efficient than 
one-step version confirms the previous results on the effect of capital base on the credit activities 
of banks in Bulgaria.  In addition to strong persistence in its level, and rate of change, credit 
variable is strongly influenced by the capital base, cap of banks but in a negative manner. 
It is also noteworthy that the variable ltliab and nintincome turns highly significant with 
positive signs while deposit variable loses much of its significance in two step estimations as a 
source of funding for credit expansion.  This finding confirms that credit expansion is mainly 
financed through long-term borrowing from the parent banks. Also, banks that are more 
profitable in terms of net interest income tend to adjust their credits more to their target level.  
The variable size has a positive sign in credit equations in contrast to the previous findings 
(Stolz, 2007), which implies that larger banks adjust their credit better than smaller banks 
towards their optimum levels. 
Due to space limitations, GMM estimation results for the equation taking capital, cap as 
the dependent variable is not reported here. But results show once again that there is a negative 
coordination of credit and capital adjustment as banks that expand credit also reduce their capital 
base, cap as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the credit variable.  Also, 
size has a positive impact on capital base in contrast to the previous findings (Stolz, 2007).31  
Larger banks need to adjust their capital more than small banks in Bulgaria although they have 
easier access to funds for attaining their target levels.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the determinants of credit supply in Bulgaria during 1999-2006 shows 
that the sustainability of the credit growth in Bulgaria may be questionable as there are signs of 
banking fragility which may cause risks in the immediate future and pose threats to the catching-
up process in terms of credit intermediation.  This paper identifies several sources of 
vulnerability in Bulgarian banking: In the face of intensifying interbank competition along with 
better access to long-term funding by parent banks in search for higher returns, Bulgarian banks 
have expanded credit (and their asset risk) while reducing their capital base, possibly reflecting 
the pressure on these affiliates to enhance return on equity.  But the trend also raises the 
probability of financial distress and exposes banks to the risk of costly adjustment in their capital 
base in the event of unexpected loan losses deriving from a sudden downturn in economic 
activity and mispricing of credit risks.  The credit boom of this period contrasts sharply with the 
pattern of bank behavior during 1997-1999 which was characterized as a period of “credit 
crunch” and the scale and speed of this transformation adds to the growing risk perceptions in the 
sector.  
In addition, the partial adjustment model estimated with GMM confirms that more 
aggressive form of credit expansion was carried out by less capitalized banks.  These banks 
seemed to be overly aggressive in lending as compared to their capital and loan loss provisions 
                                                 
30
  First-order differencing in GMM models generates serial correlation of order one when original panel model is 
characterized by serially uncorrelated disturbances.  
31
  For German savings banks, Stolz (2007) finds that capital and asset risk adjustments are negative only for banks 
with low capital buffers above the minimum capital requirement, similar to our findings. By contrast, high capital 
buffer banks tend to adjust capital and asset risk in the positive direction. 
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and may have engaged in risky lending.  Moreover, less capitalized banks, generally smaller in 
size, tended to expand credit risks at a faster pace but without adequate loan loss provisioning.   
The Bulgarian National Bank so far have implemented various prudential measures to 
instigate sound lending practices among banks, which proved ineffective during 2004-2005 to 
curb the  euphoric lending activities of banks.  Bulgarian banks that seem to be under great 
pressure for enhancing profitability by their parent banks ignored credit controls or evaded 
marginal reserve requirements through alternative channels such as their leasing affiliates.  This 
supports the view that the overwhelming presence of foreign owned banks has been no guarantee 
for prudent lending and mispricing of credit risks could mount the overall fragility of the sector.  
The US subprime mortgage crisis demonstrates the hazards associated with the 
systematic underpricing of risks by aggressive lenders even in a sophisticated banking industry 
as in the US and Europe.  The US financial meltdown suggests that in the absence of vigilant and 
effective supervision, credit may surge uncontrollably but without appropriate pricing and 
provisioning for risks. Given the current instability in the international financial markets, 
Bulgaria is exposed to greater amount of banking risks than ever.  A general economic slow-
down which is projected for the entire Central and Eastern Europe can raise the level of non-
performing loans in the sector and exhaust banks’ capital base and worse, can lead to bank 
failures.   
It seems FDI inflows in the form of long-term borrowing from mother banks have played 
a significant role for banks’ credit supply but this trend has already been reversed in a time of 
global financial crisis.  In late 2008, rising risk perceptions in the global markets have forced 
these banks to limit their credit as borrowing from their parent banks in Western Europe has 
come to an abrupt halt.  There are also signs that in the regional markets of Central and Eastern 
Europe, syndication credits are being significantly curtailed and carry a large risk premium, 
reflective of the global credit crunch.  This dramatically raises the cost of raising equity capital 
and makes banks susceptible to capital deficiency.  Since March 2008, in response to the global 
financial slowdown, most Bulgarian banks have raised their lending rates and dramatically 
reduced credit so as to contain their banking risks.  It remains to be seen how the Central and 
Eastern European banks in general and Bulgarian banks in particular will withstand the global 
financial shocks, given that they were mostly caught off-guard-overexposed in lending and 
under-capitalized. 
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